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Cash Acquirers: Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Monitoring, and 
Shareholder Returns 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Although Jensen (1988) argues that high levels of free cash flow and unused 
borrowing capacity are likely to encourage low-value mergers, the “pecking order” 
theory offers a different perspective, where managers conserve cash flow to undertake 
positive NPV investments. We argue that the stronger position of shareholders, as 
opposed to firm managers, in the UK compared to the US makes the Free Cash Flow 
(FCF) hypothesis less likely to be relevant in the UK.  In support of this, by analysing 
both announcement period and long term returns, we show that for a comprehensive 
sample of UK cash acquirers there is little support for the Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
hypothesis.  Instead, our evidence is consistent with greater shareholder monitoring 
mitigating any agency problem associated with high FCF.  Our results are also 
consistent with low FCF firms having a greater likelihood of being financially 
distressed.   
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Cash Acquirers: Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Monitoring, and 
Shareholder Returns 
Cash acquisitions are a particularly interesting sub-category of acquisition and merger 
activity.  The evidence, over time and across markets, shows that cash acquisitions 
appear to exhibit different short term and long term performance from stock-financed 
or mixed-finance acquisitions (Aggrawal and Jaffe, 2000).  Whilst there are 
differences in findings between markets (e.g. Franks, Harris and Mayer 1988), it is 
clear that cash-financed acquisitions do not appear to be associated with value-
destruction in the same way that stock-financed acquisitions are.   
 
However, whilst it is tempting to conclude that it is simply the form of financing that 
separates the shareholder value destruction of equity-financed takeovers from cash 
takeovers, such a conclusion tends to ignore the question of where the cash to fund the 
acquisition comes from in the first place.  Theory tells us this should matter, yet to our 
knowledge the only paper that has so far investigated this issue is Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009).  Whilst different theories on firm financing offer competing 
explanations on both managerial choices and shareholder preferences, it seems 
reasonable to ask the question whether the source of the cash influences the long run 
wealth effect of any cash-financed acquisition.  The most direct hypothesis on this is 
Jensen‟s (1988) free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis.  Jensen (1988, p. 34) claims that 
„free cash flow theory implies that managers of firms with unused borrowing power 
and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or even value 
destroying mergers‟.  Whilst previous studies have tested the FCF hypothesis as it 
relates to bidders (e.g. the US studies of Lang, Stulz and Walking, 1991 and Doukas 
1995; the UK study of Gregory, 2005) these studies have not tested the theory on pure 
cash acquirers, which is arguably the class of takeover to which Jensen‟s theory most 
directly relates.  Besides the direct claim that high FCF is likely to lead to poor 
acquisition investment decisions, Jensen (1986) also argues that firms that pay out 
free cash flow to shareholders need to subject themselves to monitoring in order to 
raise finance for major investments, leading to superior investment decisions.  In 
particular, debt financing has a role in reducing agency problems, motivating 
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organisational efficiency and improving management (Myers and Majluf 1984; 
Jensen 1986, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Stulz 1990). 
 
However, in regarding internally generated undistributed cash flows as giving rise to 
agency problems, and in favouring debt finance, the FCF hypothesis conflicts with 
alternative theories of capital structure to a greater or lesser extent.  Most obviously it 
is at some variance with the pecking order hypothesis, the static trade-off theory and 
the “windows of opportunity” theories.  Furthermore, the FCF hypothesis to some 
degree conflicts with the findings from the financial distress literature.  Recent 
evidence from Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), Agarawal and Taffler 
(2007,2008) and Christidis and Gregory (2010) reminds us that accounting ratio based 
models show high leverage and low cash (variously measured) are associated with a 
higher probability of financial distress.   This message is perhaps reinforced by the 
recent financial crisis, where ironically firms that followed the prescriptions of 
Jensen‟s FCF hypothesis have been badly caught out.1  Given these recent events, it 
seems timely to revisit the FCF hypothesis, and investigate whether high gearing and 
a low free cash flow are necessarily as desirable as Jensen and others have claimed 
them to be, particularly when consideration is given to the ability of shareholders to 
monitor the actions of boards of directors through other means.  
 
This ability of shareholders to mitigate agency problems is at the heart of our 
investigation.  We argue that the studies which find in favour of the FCF hypothesis 
do so in the context of markets, particularly the US, where managers have relatively 
strong rights compared to their shareholders.  So we investigate the hypothesis in an 
alternative market where shareholders have stronger rights compared to managers.  
The market we choose is the UK, a market characterised by a high level of takeover 
activity, a pattern of substantial institutional shareholding, strong shareholder 
protection, and severe restrictions on the types of bid defences favoured in the US.  
Our first hypothesis is that the agency costs of high FCF in such a market will be far 
lower, so that the potential financial distress costs of higher leverage and lower cash 
flows may actually be greater than these agency costs.  In such a case, far from high 
                                                 
1
 For example, one high profile casualty of the move to gear up and return cash to shareholders has 
been Philip Yea, former CEO of 3i. “.. investors and analysts said Mr Yea paid the price for worries 
over 3i‟s high debt levels, which have driven the share price to record lows. The group returned £2.2bn 
to investors via share buy-backs in 2006 and 2007 ” (Financial Times, 28th January, 2009).   
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FCF being associated with lower bidder returns, we would expect to see either no 
effect, or even that high FCF (or lower leverage) predicts better bidder outcomes.  Our 
second hypothesis is that the greater the degree of mitigation (as proxied by 
institutional ownership) of agency costs, the less high FCF will prove problematic, 
and the less will be any advantage from high leverage.  Note, though, that Jensen‟s 
hypothesis also predicts more hostile disciplinary takeovers, and the restrictions on 
takeover defences in the UK are likely to have some influence in limiting managers‟ 
incentives to undertake value-destroying takeovers in the first place.
2
 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  We start with a literature review and the background 
to the research design, and we go on to describe the data and methodology.  Then we 
begin by investigating whether the source of cash used to finance the acquisition has 
any bearing on the market‟s reaction to the bid.  In this regard, our analysis is in the 
same spirit as the investigation performed by Martynova and Renneboog (2009), 
although the focus of our analysis, and our investigation methods, are rather different.  
Under the FCF hypothesis, takeovers financed from internal funds should show the 
worse performance, whilst those funded from debt should show the best performance.  
In order to directly test the FCF hypothesis, we then examine the market reaction for 
acquirers classified according to their FCF position.  Next, we examine announcement 
period returns in regression tests that include form of financing and firm-specific 
control variables.  Following Cremers and Nair (2005), we test to see whether 
institutional shareholding has an impact on the relationship between FCF, leverage 
and announcement period returns.  Finally, we examine the long run returns for 
acquirers classified according to their source of funding, their FCF position, and their 
degree of institutional ownership.   
 
Our results are as follows.  Both at announcement and over the 60 month post 
acquisition, high FCF firms out-perform low FCF firms.  In contrast to the 
expectation under the FCF hypothesis, we find that the announcement period return 
difference between high FCF and low FCF firms is strongest amongst firms using 
internal finance.  Importantly, and consistent with Cremers and Nair (2005), we show 
that high FCF firms with high institutional shareholdings have returns that are 
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 The authors are grateful to Matt Cain of Notre Dame University for this observation. 
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increasing in FCF but reducing in terms of leverage, suggesting that good monitoring 
overcomes any agency problems associated with high FCF.  In the long term, we find 
that low FCF firms have significant negative abnormal returns and that the group of 
acquirers that do not have high FCF and low Q ratios (the particular sub-set of firms 
that Jensen identifies as the problem group) that out-perform other cash acquirers.  
We also show that low FCF have higher loadings on both SMB and HML factors than 
high FCF firms.  Our results are consistent with low FCF firms having a greater 
likelihood of being financially distressed.  Furthermore, our announcement period 
results show that pre-bid gearing has a weak negative association with returns.  Whilst 
our results suggest that institutional monitoring may be capable of mitigating agency 
effects, they could also be consistent with the UK takeover environment being one 
where the greater threat of hostile takeovers acts to discipline mangers of high FCF 
firms. 
 
Literature Review and Background to the Research Design 
The clear message from long run studies of acquisitions and mergers is that stock-
financed acquisitions under-perform, whilst cash financed acquisitions generally show 
no abnormal performance (Aggrawal and Jaffe, 2000).  Although some studies show 
evidence that announcement period returns can still be negative for cash acquirers 
who acquire listed targets, that result seems somewhat model and return window 
dependent (Draper and Paudyal, 2006), and invariably cash acquirers perform better 
than equity acquirers (Draper and Paudyal, 2006, 2008).  Such results have been 
described as supporting a “form of financing hypothesis” by Aggrawal and Jaffe 
(2000). Since that paper the behavioural finance literature has motivated the 
“behavioural timing” hypothesis of Loughran and Ritter (2000) and the market-driven 
acquisition hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003).  These hypotheses explain the 
poor performance of equity-financing acquirers not in terms of poor investment 
decisions, but in terms of a rational management exploiting the purchasing power of 
the over-valued equity of their companies.  Evidence in support of the Shleifer and 
Vishny (SV) hypothesis has been found in both the US (Ang and Cheng, 2006; Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh, 2006; Savor and Lu, 2009) and in the UK (Bi and 
Gregory, 2009).  The announcement period evidence in Draper and Paudyal (2008) 
also provides some support for this hypothesis. 
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With regard to the extant literature on the FCF hypothesis, the evidence as it relates to 
takeovers generally supports the hypothesis, although testing the hypothesis is not 
without its difficulties.  In theory, high FCF is only problematic when firms have poor 
investment opportunities.  It is worth reminding ourselves of what Jensen‟s hypothesis 
has to say in this respect.  High free cash flow is problematic only in cases where the 
firm has a lack of investment opportunities.  Jensen‟s prediction is that in such 
circumstances, managers will be tempted to use this free cash flow to undertake 
value-destroying mergers.  The position can readily be summarised as follows
3
: 
 
  Investment Opportunity Set 
Free Cash Flow Many positive NPV 
projects 
No positive NPV 
projects 
Low Create Value ? 
High Create Value Destroy Value 
 
This poses the problem of finding a proxy for the unobservable investment 
opportunity set.  The correct measure of this is the firm‟s marginal Tobin‟s q ratio, 
i.e. the ratio of present value of its investment opportunity set to the cost of 
undertaking that investment.  Provided q>=1, investment is in the interests of the 
shareholders.  Empirical studies have adopted various proxies for this unobservable 
marginal q, including average q (market value of equity to replacement cost of assets), 
current q compared to long run average q, and a comparison of the firm‟s book-to-
market ratio with its industry mean book-to-market ratio.  The argument for using the 
latter is that it overcomes the problem of “knowledge” assets, particularly important 
in certain industries, being excluded from the financial statements (e.g. Hall 1998).  
Gregory (2005) notes that whilst broadly similar results are obtained from all three 
measures, the latter may be a better proxy for marginal q.  In the first US investigation 
of the FCF hypothesis, Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991, hereafter LSW), study a 
sample of 101 US domestic take-overs over the period 1968-1986 and find 
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 We are grateful to Matt Cain (discussant of an earlier version of this paper at the New York Financial 
Management Association Conference) for suggesting this diagram. 
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economically and statistically significant results in favour of the hypothesis.  Defining 
q on the basis of market value of assets to replacement cost, they show that low q, 
high FCF firms are the worst performers of any of the sample sub-sets.  Support for 
the FCF hypothesis is also found by Doukas (1995) in a study of the announcement 
period returns around foreign acquisitions by US firms.  In the UK, evidence is both 
limited and mixed.  Both Gregory (2005) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) test the 
hypothesis using long terms returns.  The former reports evidence that contradicts the 
FCF hypothesis, finding that in the long term high FCF firms perform better than low 
FCF firms, and that low q, high FCF firms are the best performing sub-group over 60 
months post acquisition.  Whilst Gregory (2005) also looks at announcement month 
returns, finding that high FCF firms seem to do worse in the announcement month, he 
does not look at daily returns around announcement.  The suggestion in his study is 
that in the long term, low FCF firms are more prone to distress.  Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2006) are primarily concerned with an analysis of friendly bids, but they 
include a cash earnings type measure that they argue proxies for FCF (though they do 
not categorise firms on the basis of their investment opportunity sets).  In contrast to 
the results in Gregory (2005), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) report a negative 
association between their cash earnings proxy and returns for the one, two and three 
years post acquisition.  They note that their results are consistent with the Jensen FCF 
hypothesis, although they do not undertake any formal tests beyond a regression 
including their measure of q and their FCF proxy.  Whilst all of these studies control 
for the form of payment, none separately analyse cash acquisitions.  This is an 
important shortcoming, as it is far from obvious why an equity financed takeover 
should reveal a great deal about the FCF hypothesis.  By contrast, a pure cash 
takeover represents the direct expenditure of a firm‟s free cash flow. 
 
Critically, the FCF hypothesis assumes that an agency problem exists that can best be 
overcome by requiring managers to disgorge cash to the shareholders.  However, 
recent work (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005) 
demonstrates that shareholder rights have an important impact on both returns and 
performance.  The former shows that firms with the strongest shareholder rights 
outperform those with the weakest by 8.5% per annum.  Cremers and Nair (2005) 
shows that a simpler three component measure of shareholder rights, the Alternative 
Takeover Protection Index (ATI), complements the effect of block shareholdings. We 
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argue that there are important differences between shareholder rights between the UK 
and the US that are likely to reduce the agency problems of high FCF.  For example, 
Bush (2005), in the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales‟s 
Dialogue in Corporate Governance initiative series notes “the common language of 
the UK and US can at times create a superficial similarity in both governance and 
reporting matters, when beneath the surface, the law is entirely different in intent and 
effect”.  More bluntly, as Mark Roe, Professor of Law at Harvard University notes in 
a recent Financial Times article: “Corporate and securities law in the US already 
strongly favours managers over shareholders. Usually, it is just fine that shareholders 
are distant from the corporation and its directors; shareholders don’t know the 
company’s business, while directors and managers do. But when directors or 
executives stumble, American shareholders (in contrast to British and other nations) 
today have only weak tools to influence or replace the faltering chief executive.”4  
These international differences centre on both aspects of the Cremers and Nair (2005) 
analysis.  First, UK shareholdings are dominated by institutional investors.  In the 
middle decade of our study, the figures in our appendix (Office of National Statistics 
data and NYSE data) show that UK domestic institutions hold larger proportions of 
the UK market than is the case for the US.  Furthermore, the large pension, unit trust 
and insurance company shareholdings in the UK are managed by a highly 
concentrated group of fund managers.  Stapledon and Bates (2002, Table 2) show that 
the top twenty UK fund managers controlled 37.06% of the UK market by value as at 
the end of 1997.  The top three alone controlled just under 11%.  We argue that this 
puts UK shareholders in a far more powerful position relative to management than 
would be the case in the US.  As Gregory and Matatko (2005) observe “In practice, 
this means that the chances of a bid succeeding without the tacit approval of this fund 
management group are remote – it is likely that they will be managing equity stakes in 
both target and acquiring companies, unless these are small and illiquid stocks”.  
Sudarsanam (2000) also notes that “Since, in the UK, large acquisitions require 
shareholder approval…block shareholders and institutional shareholders are likely to 
have the opportunity to vet the proposed acquisitions”.   Second, all of the three ATI 
measures identified Cremers and Nair (2005), namely staggered boards, restrictions 
on shareholder voting rights, and “blank checks” (or “poison pills”) are virtually 
                                                 
4
 Financial Times, January 25
th
 2010. 
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impossible to implement in the UK, because of conflicts with Stock Exchange rules or 
the operation of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.  In particular, Rule 21 of 
the City Code, “Restrictions on Frustrating Action”, specifically rules out any asset 
sales, security issuance or other devices which may be categorised as “poison pill” 
measures unless they have been approved by a general meeting of the shareholders.  
As Sudarsanam (2001) notes, “Poison pills…..are unknown in the UK”, and “Equally 
rare….is a staggered board of directors”.  Furthermore, in the UK the executive 
compensation package has to be approved by a majority vote of shareholders and, 
since the 1992 Cadbury Report, corporate governance structures have been designed 
to ensure managers act in the best interests of the shareholders.  Sudarsanam (2001) 
highlights the important differences between the UK and US in this regard.  We 
hypothesise that the greater ability of shareholders to exert influence over a firm‟s 
managers in the UK leads to free cash flow being far less of a problem than it might 
be in countries where shareholders have lesser rights over managers.   
 
As we noted in the introduction, to some degree the FCF hypothesis is in conflict with 
other theories of capital structure.  Under the pecking-order theory of Myers and 
Majluf (1984), managers try to conserve cash in order to make rational investments on 
behalf of the shareholders.  Internal equity is unambiguously better than external 
equity, and financial slack is desirable under the pecking-order theory.  This is 
diametrically opposed to the order preferences and the view of financial slack put 
forward in the FCF hypothesis. However, debt issues are second choice in the pecking 
order theory, so a gearing-increasing transaction would be regarded as more desirable 
than the use of any other form of external financing.  Under a static trade-off theory 
managers are trying to work towards a long-run target debt:equity ratio, implying that 
free cash flow may be either conserved, used to retire debt, or paid out to shareholders 
depending on where the firm is currently positioned relative to its long term target 
ratio.  This theory would predict that the market reaction to financing choice would be 
contingent on where the firm was positioned relative to its (difficult to observe) long-
run optimal gearing level.  Under the Loughran and Ritter (1995) “windows of 
opportunity” hypothesis, managers are reacting to perceived mis-valuations of their 
firm and targeting the form of financing employed according to their perceptions of 
relative value.  Here any issue of equity should be “bad news” as firms choose equity 
issuance when equity is over-valued.  Managers will opt to issue debt when equity is 
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under-valued.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Baker and Wurgler (2000) show that 
stock returns are low following the issue of equity, and it is well-documented that 
long run stock returns are low following equity-financed acquisitions (Agrawal and 
Jaffe, 2000; Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1992; Gregory, 1997; Loughran and Vijh, 
1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).    
 
Data and Methodology 
The sample consists of UK domestic cash financed acquisitions, with both bidders 
and targets being listed companies traded on the London Stock Exchange. The sample 
period for the acquisitions is between January 1984 and December 2002.  Because the 
data found in Securities Data Company (SDC) is not wholly reliable, particularly for 
the earlier years of this study, the sample is selected from data obtained from both 
SDC and Acquisitions Monthly (AMDATA) database, combined with a cross-check 
to the Acquisitions Monthly publication.
5
 The daily stock returns and the return on the 
FTSE All Share Index are from Datastream‟s Total Return Index series, while the 
monthly returns and market capitalisations for each acquirer are taken from the 
London Business School Share Price Database (LSPD).  
 
The requirements for the research sample are as below: 
 
1. Both acquirer and target firms are listed companies and traded on the London 
Stock Exchange; 
2. The transaction is disclosed and listed as completed; and 
3. The transaction consideration is wholly in cash. 
 
Following these criteria, the sample size is 275. In order to eliminate noise caused by 
large bidders acquiring small targets, a minimum relative size cut-off is imposed: the 
target‟s market capitalisation has to be at least 5% of that of the acquirer‟s. We also 
require announcement period returns to be available from Datastream, and, as a 
minimum, for takeover month returns to be available from the LSPD.  These criteria 
reduce the sample size to 169 firms. In order to measure FCF we require financial 
reports to be available for the year prior to the bid, and we also require financial 
                                                 
5
 Martynova and Renneboog (2009) make similar observations on the reliability of the SDC data. 
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statements to be available for the combined firm for the year in which the bid takes 
place in order to calculate the net debt change. A lack of such availability for 11 firms 
further reduces the sample size to 156. In addition there are 4 sample firms missing 
data for calculating the takeover premium, which reduces the final sample to 152 
firms.  
 
The criterion for determining which type of financing is the “dominant” source of 
cash is that the fraction of the bid price paid from the financing source must be over 
50%. To calculate this, we first determine the external sources of funding in the 
takeover year by looking at issued equity for cash or net increases in debt, then 
ascribe the balance to internal financing. In doing so, we consider the consolidated 
debt of both acquirer and target firms, monitoring any increase in debt of the 
combined firm compared to the pre-bid values for target and acquirer.  Note that in 
this regard we differ from Martynova and Renneboog (2009) who define debt 
financing differently.
67
    Formally, the model used for this research follows the 
approach established in Dichev and Protroski (1999), defined as: 
ΔLTDt = (LTDt +CPLTDt –LTCDt)Consolidated – [(LTDt-1 +CPLTDt-1 –LTCDt-1)Target 
+ (LTDt-1 +CPLTDt-1 –LTCDt-1)Acquirer] 
Where: 
LTDt represents the amount of long-term debt due in more than one year 
(Datastream code WC03251); 
CPLTDt represents the current portion of long-term debt (WC18232); 
LTCDt represents the convertible portion of long-term debt (WC18282).  
 
There are 22 bidders with records of having issued equity for cash, and 112 bidders 
where there is a positive increment in long-term debt. We determine these new issues 
of equity by analysing data from Datastream and the Stock Exchange Official 
Yearbook (SEOYB), augmented by hand-collected annual report and accounts data 
where Datastream records are missing. Use of the SEOYB is important to avoid 
                                                 
6
 Martynova and Renneboog (2009) use information primarily from LexisNexis but cross-checked 
against the SDC bond and equity issue databases to determine whether debt financing has been used.  
We are grateful to Luc Renneboog for this clarification. 
7
 Furthermore, as we explain below we classify bids according to their dominant source of finance 
rather than debt issuance per se. 
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confusing firms that issue equity to markets for cash as opposed to those issuing 
equity through stock options.  We use the annual reports for the latest financial year 
pre-bid and the financial year post-bid in making this determination.  If the fraction of 
either issued equity for cash or issued debt combined is not more than 50% of the bid 
value, we consider internal financing as the dominant source of cash for the takeover 
bid.  However, in some cases, both issued equity for cash and the debt increase exceed 
100% of the transaction value, with the obvious implication that the firm is raising 
financing for organic expansion as well as takeover
8
. If neither method of financing 
exceeds the other by more than a ratio of 100%, this case is classified as “Mixed” 
financing. If that ratio is exceeded, the higher amount determines the “dominant” 
financing method. In terms of takeovers using internal financing (IF), we further 
consider cases where there is an important secondary financing method, since 
although this secondary financing is less than 50% of the financing source, it could 
still be an important part of the transaction value. Consequently, we form an internal 
financing with a significant secondary financing method, or IFS, group which 
contains three sub-groups: IFS-IEC, IFS-ID and IFS-Mixed.  These classifications 
are, respectively: firms using internal finance where issued equity is between 5% and 
50% of transaction value; firms using internal finance where new debt is between 5% 
and 50% of transaction value; and firms where both new debt and new equity exceed 
5%.  We do not claim that these classifications are perfect.  If it were possible, we 
would prefer to study the issue of financing sources in a fixed window around a bid.  
Unfortunately, in the UK very small numbers of firms issued debt in the form of 
corporate bonds during our study period, hence our use of the Dichev and Protroski 
(1999) approach.  As a robustness check, we carry out a simple four way 
classification of funding sources where any increase of debt or equity for cash over 
5% results in the source being classified as debt, equity or mixed as appropriate.  Our 
results are robust to this alternative classification.   
 
We also need to define our measure of free cash flow (FCF). We measure FCF as in 
Gregory (2005) and Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991).  FCF is defined as the funds 
from operating cash flow balance minus: tax paid; dividends paid; interest on short 
term and long term loans; change in debtors; and change in stocks and WIP.  And 
                                                 
8
 Note that we exclude multiple takeovers in the same year 
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plus: change in creditors; income from investments; and income from quoted 
investments. The amount is then normalised by capital employed. A firm with high 
FCF is one that has a pre-bid year average cash holding that is higher than the median 
of the whole sample. We also use a three-year average FCF figure as a robustness 
check.  Results are qualitatively similar, although somewhat weaker, than those that 
use the pre-bid cash flow figure.   
 
Alternatively, we could measure surplus cash holdings, rather than free cash flow, 
although we note that the hypothesis is a free cash flow not a free cash stock 
hypothesis.  Nonetheless, we acknowledge that a significant body of literature 
investigating corporate cash holdings has emerged following the seminal work of 
Harford (1999).  In principle, one could estimate the Harford (1999) model but to do 
so in the context of this sample would require that industry level cash flow 
information was available for all firms going back to 1981.
9
  The problem is that there 
are many missing dead firms in the Datastream data in early years.  As we note 
above, many of our sample firms (particularly the targets) needed the data to be hand 
collected and Gregory, Thayan and Huang (2009) have to hand-collect a significant 
proportion of their sample firms.  As these missing firms are primarily either failed 
firms or acquired firms, it is highly likely that any attempt to estimate the Harford 
(1999) model back as far as 1981 will result in biased estimates.  Accordingly, we 
develop an alternative measure of surplus cash, which is simply the ratio of the cash 
stock/capital employed in year t-1 divided by the average of this ratio for the previous 
three years.  A cash stock ratio greater than unity implies that the firm is increasing its 
cash stock.  Although this is not our preferred measure we run robustness checks 
using this variable in place of our free cash flow measure, and footnote where results 
using this measure differ from those reported. 
 
We now need a measure of the investment opportunity set.  For the purpose of testing 
the FCF hypothesis, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) and Gregory (2005) use the q 
ratio as a measure of the investment opportunity set facing the firm. The assumption 
is that firms with a q ratio>1 have a positive NPV investment opportunity set. There 
is, however, a major difficulty in applying the q ratio to a UK company, in that the 
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 Inter alia, the model requires three prior years of cash flow and sales data for every firm in the 
industry. 
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replacement cost information of assets is not available in the UK from any source 
(Gregory 2005, Sudarsanam and Mahate 2006).  Furthermore, as we note above, the 
q-ratio measure should be reflective of a firm‟s marginal q, not average q.  Thus we 
need a reasonable proxy for this marginal q, which can be either a simple book-to-
market ratios (BMV) or a comparison of BMV ratios to the industry average. Because 
of the inadequacy of using of using simple BMV, partly due to high inflation in the 
earlier years in our sample, and partly because of the Hall (1998) observation that 
important “knowledge assets” are not recorded in the financial statements, we choose 
BMV compared to the industry average as a proxy of q ratio, so that a high q firm is 
defined as one with a book-to-market ratio that is lower than its industry average.  
This is the same approach adopted in Gregory (2005).  Industry classification follows 
that in Gregory and Michou (2009).  For the whole sample, there are 98 firms with a 
low q, and 54 firms with a high q
10
.  We then use these definitions of q and FCF to 
partition firms into four categories from high FCF, high q to low FCF, low q. 
 
We also include a number of control variables based upon findings elsewhere in the 
literature.  These are the pre-tax return on capital employed (ROCE), the pre-bid 
gearing ratio of the acquirer (equal to the firm‟s long-term debt divided by its capital 
employed), a dummy variable for a hostile offer, and variables that control for relative 
size, the bid premium and the shareholder structure. Relative size is the target 
company‟s market capitalisation compared to the bidder‟s market capitalisation. 
According to Hansen‟s (1987) model, the asymmetric information problem will 
increase as the target‟s firm size increases, because the risk between the acquirer and 
target will become larger, and a similar conclusion follows from the risk sharing 
hypothesis of Martin (1996).  Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that the abnormal 
returns become smaller and eventually become negative if the relative size of the 
target firm to the acquirer firm increases.  However, Asquith, Bruner and Mullins 
(1983) reach the opposite conclusion. The acquisition premium is the difference 
between the price paid per share in the transaction and the share price as a percentage 
of the target share price at four weeks before the announcement of the acquisition. 
The relevant data is rom the SDC or AMDATA databases, although if this is missing 
                                                 
10
 The preponderance of low q firms in this sample of cash acquirers is consistent with the Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) hypothesis and the evidence in Bi and Gregory (2009) which finds that cash acquirers 
are more lowly valued than equity acquirers. 
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we use the pre-bid share price from Datastream and the bid price.  Finally, we control 
for shareholder structure.  
 
Blockholders and institutional shareholders can perform a monitoring function and 
reduce agency problems (Jensen, 1991; Cremers and Nair, 2005).  As we note above, 
in a UK setting where shareholders have greater rights over corporate managers than 
they do in the US, this monitoring function could assist in overcoming any inherent 
problems from firm managers having “excessive” levels of free cash flow at their 
disposal.  Provided firms are adequately monitored, free cash flow and modest levels 
of gearing might provide firms with a sensible cushion against distress-inducing 
events, and, exactly as predicted by the pecking order hypothesis, with a pool of cash 
with which to undertake positive NPV investments when it may be difficult to obtain 
funds from other sources.  In this study, information on substantial shareholders has to 
be hand-collected from the SEOYB
11, which lists each firm‟s substantial shareholders, 
including individual directors, institutional and non-institutional shareholding. We 
adopt the approach and cut-off employed from Martin (1996), and split the internal 
ownership thus: directors with shares of less than 25% but more than 5%; those with 
more than 25% of the company; institutional shareholdings in excess of 5%; and non-
institutional shareholdings in excess of 5%.   In UK law, 25% is a particularly 
important shareholding level, as special resolutions (which include resolutions to 
increase or decrease capital) require a 75% majority.  If our conjectures on monitoring 
are correct, then we would expect to observe differences between FCF and gearing 
between high and low institutional ownership firms, and we perform a simple test for 
this. 
 
Finally, in our regression tests we use the amount of issued debt and equity as 
alternatives to the simple classification rules described above. These variables are 
calculated by using the amount of issued equity (for cash) (IEC) and issued debt (ID) 
both standardised by transaction value (TV).  
 
Overall, the variables can be summarised thus: 
 
                                                 
11
 No alternative sources are available back to 1984. 
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Definition of Variables 
AHQ = Dummy variable equal to one if the acquiring firm has low BMV (high q 
ratio) relative to its industry BMV 
CAR5, 11 = Cumulative abnormal returns for the 5 day interval t-2 to t+2, and the 11 
day interval t-5 to t+5 respectively 
CFCE = FCF one year prior to the bid year divided by capital employed  
CFCELQ = CFCE if the firm‟s AHQ is equal to zero, zero otherwise 
HFCHQ = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has high CFCE (greater than the 
sample median)  and AHQ equal to one 
HFCLQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has high CFCE (greater than the 
sample median) and AHQ equal to zero 
HOSTILE = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is defined as a hostile bidder in 
the SDC platinum dataset (cross-checked with Acquisitions Monthly) 
ID = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is a debt issue 
IDTV =    Issued debt used for the bid divided by transaction value 
IEC = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is an equity 
issue 
IECTV =  Issued equity for cash used in the bid divided by transaction value 
IF = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is internal 
IFS = Dummy variable equal to one if the source of bid financing is primarily internal 
but with a significant secondary issue of either debt or equity. 
INSTH = Amount of institutional shareholding in excess of 5%
12
 
LEV =Acquirer‟s long-term debt divided by capital employed at FYE prior to the bid 
year 
LFCHQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low CFCE (less than the 
sample median)  and AHQ equal to one 
LFCLQ = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low CFCE (less than the 
sample median) and AHQ equal to zero 
MBV = Market value at the beginning of bid month / Book value at financial year end 
(FYE) prior to the bid year  
NONINSTH = Amount of non-institutional shareholdings in excess of 5% 
                                                 
12
 See footnote 8. 
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OFFDIR5 = 0 if directors‟ holdings (in %) are less than 5%13, or equal to Directors‟ 
holdings (in %) minus 5, if 5% < directors‟ holdings < 25% 
OFFDIR25 = 0 if Directors‟ holdings (in %) < 25%, or equal to Directors‟ holdings 
(in %) minus 25 if directors‟ holdings >=25% 
PREMIUM = bid premium paid for the target, measured as the bid price minus the 
price one month pre-bid 
RELSIZE = Market capitalisation of the target firm divided by market capitalisation 
of the acquirer  
ROCE = Acquirer‟s pre-tax profit before the bid divided by capital employed 
 
In calculating short run returns, we use a simple market adjusted returns model using 
the FT All Share Index (FTASI) as our market proxy, to calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns over the intervals day t-20 to day t+20, day t-5 to day t+5, and  day 
t-2 to day t+2.  Draper and Paudyal (2008) also employ a market adjusted returns 
model.  We favour a simple market adjusted returns measure as it avoids any thin 
trading problems inherent in using daily returns to calculate market-model 
parameters.  The significance of abnormal returns can be estimated as in Brown and 
Warner (1985), but as a robustness check we also calculate the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic, more normally associated with the testing of long run 
abnormal returns, from Lyon et al (1999).  However, whilst expanding the window 
from 5 days around announcement to 11 days seems to capture a significant increase 
in market reaction, expanding the window to 41 days around announcement merely 
adds noise.  As such, we drop the 41 day CARs and concentrate our regression tests 
on the 11-day window.  A summary of these variables, together with their means and 
standard deviations, is given in Table 1. 
 
It is well-documented that longer term returns to acquisitions are as a whole are 
significantly less than zero, although the evidence on returns to cash acquisitions is 
mixed (see, for example, Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000).  In the UK, Gregory (1997) shows 
that long run abnormal returns to cash acquirers are negative, but not significantly so.  
More recently, Conn et al (2005) show that domestic cash acquirer performance over 
                                                 
13
 Note: For the earlier years in our sample, companies were only required to notify the Stock Exchange 
of holdings in excess of 5% of total shareholdings, so that holdings of less than 5% are simply 
unobservable.  This threshold was later reduced to 3%, but for consistency we retain the 5% limit. 
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the period 1984-1998 is virtually zero.  A question investigated in this paper is 
whether that long run performance might vary according to the source of cash, and 
whether it varies with FCF.  A consensus seems to be emerging that whilst buy and 
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are useful for depicting the experience of investors, 
statistical inference from BHARs is highly problematic.
14
  The properties of calendar 
time abnormal returns (CTARs) avoids the problem of cross sectional dependence in 
the abnormal returns (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), although as Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) point out, CTAR tests will be weak if managers exercise “behavioural timing” 
in corporate financing decisions.  Given this emerging consensus, we base our 
analysis of long run abnormal returns on CTARs.  The question then arises of how 
best to estimate these CTARs.  Whenever we calculate abnormal returns in calendar 
time, we have the choice between measuring returns relative to a risk-controlled 
benchmark, or using a regression-based framework, such as the Fama-French model.  
Lyon et al. (1999, p.197) suggest that simple CTAR methods appear to be better 
specified (and more conservative) than the Fama-French three factor approach.  
Mitchell and Stafford (2000, p.321) also favour the control-portfolio CTAR 
methodology rather than the Fama-French regression-based approach, noting that 
because it suffers from fewer statistical flaws “more faith should be placed in these 
results”.  However, against this Ang and Zhang (2004) provide evidence in favour of 
the Fama-French model, but specifically advise against using the Carhart four factor 
model in tests.   Their simulation results suggest that in calendar time, the Fama-
French method is well-specified, but they also show that more powerful tests result 
from using weighted least squares (WLS) rather than ordinary least squares (OLS).  
An added concern for UK researchers is that it is far from clear that the Fama-French 
model is entirely appropriate in a UK context (Gregory, Harris and Michou, 2001; Al-
Horani, Pope and Stark, 2003; Michou, Mouselli and Stark, 2007; Gregory, Tharyan 
and Huang, 2009).  These contradictory findings in the literature lead us to adopt two 
approaches to the estimation of CTARs: a control firm approach, which follows that 
used in a recent study of UK IPOs (Gregory, Guermat and Al-Shawawreh, 2010); and 
a WLS Fama-French model following Ang and Zhang (2004). 
 
                                                 
14
 See, for example, Brad Barber‟s recent seminar at the Financial Management Association 
Conference, Reno, October 2009. 
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The Gregory et al (2010) model allows for some variation between the characteristics 
of the benchmark portfolio and the characteristics of the event firm portfolio, and also 
deals with the problem of heteroscedasticity.  To implement this we regress the 
portfolio of cash acquirers on a size-matched control portfolio.  Let tR ,  be the time 
series of a portfolio of the returns of acquiring companies that undertake a cash 
takeover within the previous τ months.  We undertake the basic calendar time test by 
testing for the significance of   in a time series model  
t
E
tt RR    )( ,,        (1) 
where EtR )( ,  is the required (or benchmark) return and t  is a zero mean disturbance 
term.   
 
The innovation in their paper is to allow for heteroscedasticity in the CTARs by using 
a GLS approach.  For an equally weighted portfolio, the  -month calendar time 
portfolio return is: 
, ( )
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where tn ,  is the number of firms in the portfolio and 
)(
itR  is the return of a firm i  
that was a cash acquirer within the last   months.  The assumption is that the 
variance of this calendar time portfolio can be approximated by some function of 
tn10
ˆˆ   , and to ensure that the variance is positive they assume 
)ˆˆexp()(ˆ 10 ttt nuraV   . They then operationalise the model by taking the 
unrestricted residuals tuˆ  from  
 tbtt uRR   ,  
And then by estimating the regression  
 ttt errornu  )log()ˆlog( 10
2   
Finally, they estimate ))log(ˆˆexp()(ˆ 10 tt nuraV   .  As Gregory et al (2010) show, 
this GLS formulation offers a better fit in terms of adjusted R-squared statistics than 
the alternative White (1980) heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors.  We find a 
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similar result in this paper, although inferences from the White (1980) approach are 
broadly similar.  Note that conceptually, this model can be applied perfectly well to 
the Fama-French model, and indeed we do so.  Nonetheless, given the evidence in 
Ang and Zhang (2004) relates solely to WLS, we only report these WLS results in the 
paper.  However, results are slightly stronger from the GLS method.  Inferences are 
generally the same, with the exception of one of our portfolios which we identify 
below.   
 
Specifically, the Fama-French three factor model regression which we estimate is: 
 
tttftmtftt HMLhSMBsRRbaRR   ..,     (3) 
The Fama-French factors are described in Gregory, Tharyan and Huang (2009) and 
downloaded from their website.  The factors are constructed so as to mimic, as closely 
as possible, the US factors available on Ken French‟s data pages. 
 
Finally on the subject of long term returns, whilst CTARs have the inference 
advantages referred to above, one disadvantage is that they do not lend themselves to 
the regression-based tests we use for CARs.  So instead, we partition our sample 
according to form of financing, and by FCF and q. 
 
Results 
Our first results are those based upon CARs partitioned by form of financing, FCF 
and q and FCF, in Table 2.  Overall, the 5-day CARs are an insignificant -0.2%, 
whilst the 11 day CARs are -0.36%, though still insignificant.  The only financing 
sub-group to record a significant 11-day return is the debt issuing group.
15
  Here, the 
CAR is -1.78%, significant at the 5% level using both a Brown-Warner t-test or the 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test.  For both windows, the internal financing 
group show the best returns, although these returns are not significant at conventional 
levels.  As a further check that these results are not being driven by outliers, we also 
report medians and test the significance of the medians using a Wilcoxon Sign-Rank 
test.  Medians are close to the means, and again the 11-day CAR for the ID group is 
                                                 
15
 Note that throughout the partitioned tests, we do not report CARs or CTARs for the mixed and 
equity-issuing categories as the number of firms is too small to allow meaningful inferences to be 
drawn.  We do, however, include dummy variables for these categories in the regression tests. 
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significantly negative at the 5% level.  Although modest, these preliminary results 
provide more support for the pecking-order hypothesis than the FCF hypothesis.  
Partitioning by FCF shows that both short window and longer window CARs are 
positive for high FCF firms, and negative for low FCF firms, though none of the 
figures are significant except in the case of the -1.3% median for the low FCF group.  
However, when we partition on the basis of both q and FCF, we see that the worst 
returns are for low FCF, high q firms, which record a return of -2.3% over 5 days, and 
-4.2% over 11 days.  The former is significant at the 10% level using a the BW t-test, 
whereas the latter is significant at the 5% level using both BW and bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-tests.  Although medians are closer to zero than the means, they 
are significantly negative for this group at the 5% level for both 5 day and 11 day 
windows. 
 
Table 3 then partitions the 11-day CARs by both FCF difference and cash-source 
category (Panel A) and by FCF and q (Panel B).  Differences are tested using a two-
tailed t-test assuming unequal variances, and by a non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum (or Mann-Whitney) test.  Overall, the high FCF firms have CARs that are 2.4% 
higher than their low FCF counterparts, the difference being significant at the 5% 
level for both the t-test and non-parametric tests.  When we partition by the source of 
funds we find that the largest, and significant, difference in CARs is in the internal 
financing category.  Here, the high FCF firms have returns that are 4.5% higher than 
low FCF firms, and again this result is also significant at the 5% level using a non-
parametric test.  In every source of financing sub-sample, high FCF firms have better 
returns than low FCF firms, although the differences are not significant in the case of 
the IFS and ID firms.  Panel B shows the results when firms are partitioned by q and 
FCF.  Recall that the FCF hypothesis predicts that high FCF, low q firms are the 
problem case.  As we have already seen from Table 2, the bad news for the FCF 
hypothesis is that this category of firms turns out to have the best overall 
performance.  However, the 1.4% difference in CARs between high and low FCF 
firms in the low q category fails to be significant.  Ironically, it is FCF differences 
amongst high q firms that turn out to be significant, with high FCF firms out-
performing low FCF firms by 4.9%.  This result is significant at the 5% level using a 
t-test, and at the 1% level when we employ the non-parametric test.  Amongst high 
FCF firms, q differences are insignificant in explaining returns, but in the low FCF 
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group high q firms under-perform low q firms by 3.8%, significant at the 10% level 
under a t-test, but significant at the 5% level using a non-parametric test.  All our 
results so far are robust to using our alternative cash stock ratio measure, where high 
cash stock firms are defined as those with a cash stock ratio greater than unity. 
 
On the basis of the results so far, there is little support for the FCF hypothesis.  
Announcement returns are the opposite to those predicted by the hypothesis, with 
high FCF firms out-performing low FCF firms, and, most tellingly, low FCF high q 
firms experiencing significant negative returns.  In addition, firms that acquired for 
cash principally funded by an increase in debt seem to experience worst returns than 
those choosing internal finance.  We now turn to more rigorous tests of the hypothesis 
that control for our firm-specific variables.  In Table 4, we run regressions with the 11 
day CAR as the dependent variable, and with all control variables included.  All t-
statistics are calculated using White (1980) corrected standard errors.  The basic 
models we use to test the FCF hypothesis are as follows.  Model 1A includes both the 
CFCE, the free cash flow proxy, and AHQ, the proxy for high q bidders.  Model 1B 
adds the actual financing proportions IECTV and IDTV to the FCF measures and the 
control variables.  Models 2A and 2B repeat the experiment, but using CFCELQ as 
the free cash flow proxy.  Model 3 then reports results (including financing 
proportions) using HighFCFHQ, HighFCFLQ (the category predicted to experience 
negative market returns under the FCF hypothesis) and LowFCFHQ dummies, with 
lowFCFLQ forming the base case (and hence being picked up by the constant). 
 
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 (Model 1A) we see that none of the control variables 
are significant at conventional levels, that AHQ has a negative but not quite 
significant (p=0.109) impact on announcement period returns, but that CFCE has a 
significant positive impact.  Pre-bid leverage has a weakly significant negative 
association with returns.  These result holds for Model 1B (columns 3-4) and further 
suggests that the proportion of issued debt has a negative impact on performance, the 
effect is not significant.  For Model 2A, we have the result that CFCELQ just fails to 
have a significant positive impact (Cols 5-6), but once we include the financing 
proportion variables the coefficient is significantly positive (p=0.056).  Once again, 
pre-bid leverage has a negative association with returns (p=0.037 and 0.042 for 
models 2A and 2B respectively) and the proportion of debt issued is a highly 
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significant predictor of negative announcement period returns.  Finally, Models 3A 
and 3B in the final four columns of Table 4 show that significant negative returns of -
3.5% or -3.4% (Models 3A and 3B respectively) come from the lowFCF, high q sub-
group.  The FCF-hypothesised “problem” group, highFCF, low q, have positive, but 
insignificant, returns equivalent to 1.1% and 1.3% respectively. However, in the case 
of Models 3A and 3B pre-bid leverage loses its significant explanatory power.  These 
results are similar when the cash stock ratio is employed as our measure of FCF, 
except that the equivalent of the CFLQ measure simply fails to be significant at 
conventional levels.  
 
There is no hint in any of our results that high free cash flow is negatively associated 
with bidder performance, nor that using high levels of debt to finance a bid is 
perceived as beneficial by the market.  Rather, it seems as though having low levels of 
free cash flow is regarded as a negative signal by markets, and that this is particularly 
true in the case of high q firms.  To the extent that it is significant, the use of 
extensive debt financing appears to have a negative association with announcement 
period returns, and high levels of pre-bid leverage are also, to some extent, associated 
with negative performance in cash bids. Furthermore, once FCF is controlled for it 
appears that firms which use internal financing do better than firms that use other 
sources of funding for their cash bids.  Taken as a whole, these announcement period 
results contradict the FCF hypothesis, and are more consistent with markets viewing 
acquirers that have high FCF levels as having lower financial distress risk.  As a final 
robustness check, we re-ran the regressions including market timing variables known 
either to predict the market risk premium or future returns (Harris and Sanchez-Valle, 
2000), or to influence the choice of financing method.  These variables were: the prior 
12 months return on the market; the dividend yield on the market; the Treasury Bill 
rate; and the difference between the long gilt rate and the Treasury Bill rate.  As none 
of these variables turned out to be significant in predicting the CARs, nor did they 
change our inferences, we do not report those regressions here.
16
 
 
As we note above, in general UK company law and the City Code places greater 
emphasis on shareholder rights relative to manager rights than does US law.  We 
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 The authors are grateful to Paul Draper for suggesting this robustness check. 
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further argued that strong institutional shareholding in the UK was likely to reinforce 
that position.  One obvious test is to examine whether high FCF is less of a problem in 
high institutional ownership firms than low institutional ownership firms.  We split 
our sample using the 25% threshold explained above, and run separate parsimonious 
regressions on our CFCELQ variable for high and low ownership firms.
17
  As a 
further robustness check, we change the institutional ownership threshold to 10%.  
The results are reported in Table 5.  The first two columns show the results from the 
high institutional ownership group (n = 46), and confirm that in this sub-group, high 
FCF firms have positive returns, but high gearing firms have negative returns.  IDTV 
is negative, and highly significant and intriguingly IECTV is significantly positive.  
Last, within this group returns seem to be positively related to institutional ownership 
and modest levels of directors‟ ownership.  However, in the low institutional 
ownership sub-group in columns 5 and 6 (n=106), explanatory power is far lower, and 
although CFCELQ and LEV retain the same signs, neither is significant.  We re-run 
the regressions using a more modest cut-off for institutional ownership of 10%.  The 
results are reported in Columns 3-4 of Table 5 for the high ownership group, and the 
final columns of Table 5 for the low ownership group.  The central results on 
CFCELQ and IEDTV are unaltered, as is IECTV, but note that LEV now becomes 
significantly negative.  For the low ownership group, only IECTV is a significant 
negative predictor of abnormal returns.  It seems that even modest levels of 
institutional ownership are enough to ensure high FCF and low gearing are positive 
indicators of the likely success of the acquisition.  We see this as consistent with our 
argument that good monitoring, coupled with high levels of shareholder rights, is able 
to overcome any agency conflicts affecting the financing of any cash acquisition.  
However, these effects are not robust to the use of a cash stock ratio, as when we 
substitute our cash stock ratio measure for CFCELQ the variable is simply 
insignificant. 
 
Of course, given the findings from the long-term acquirer performance literature, it 
may be that at announcement markets under-react to news about the takeover.  It 
could be the case that markets simply fail to anticipate the full importance of free cash 
flow at the time of the takeover.  Furthermore, it can be argued that by looking at the 
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 We run separate regressions as factors affecting performance in both groups turn out to be very 
different.  
 27 
change in consolidated debt and acquirer equity over the year of takeover, our 
methods of determining bid financing necessarily involve some look ahead bias.  A 
comprehensive test of the hypothesis therefore requires us to examine long run 
returns.  As in the case of many long term studies (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 
1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), we choose to look at 
returns for the 60-month period following the acquisition.  Note, however, that Ang 
and Zhang (2004) show that whilst long-horizon CTAR returns from the three-factor 
model are well specified, they have low power to detect abnormal returns at long 
horizons.  Table XI in Lyon et al (1999) also suggests that tests using control 
portfolios are generally well specified, but tend to be more conservative than 
inferences from the Fama-French regressions at the 60 month horizon, particularly 
with regard to the detection of negative abnormal performance.
18
  Ang and Zhang 
(2004, p.266-7) also note that the FF regressions have lower power to detect negative 
induced returns, particularly at long horizons.     
 
Turning to the results themselves, Table 6 presents the results for the GLS model of 
Gregory et al (2010).  Overall, and in line with previous findings on UK cash 
takeovers, alphas are slightly negative but not significantly different from zero.  
Looking at the different financing groups, we see that although the debt issuers have 
the worst performance, at -0.26% per month, the effect is not significant.  However, 
when we turn to the results partitioned on FCF, we see that low FCF firms register a 
significant (at the 10% level) negative abnormal return of -0.31% per month. One 
difficulty with partitioning too finely on a small sample is that the sub-grouping tend 
to be too small to exhibit significance.  This is a particular problem when partitioning 
on both q and FCF, and we deal with this by simply partitioning into the hypothised 
“problem” group of High FCF, Low q firms and compare them to remaining firms.  
When we do so, it turns out that the high FCF, low q sub-group of acquirers that are 
hypothesised to have the worst performance under the FCF hypothesis actually 
exhibit insignificant positive performance, whereas the remainder exhibit significant 
negative performance of -0.32% per month.   
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 Specifically, the rejection rate in random samples is 1.3% compared to a theoretical level of 2.5%. 
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Given our announcement period results, we also partition on the basis of institutional 
ownership.  In the final two columns of Table 6 we report the high (>=25%) 
institutional and low (< 25%) institutional ownership sub-samples.  The former have 
an insignificant positive return, but the latter exhibit a significant (at the 10% level) 
negative return of -0.36% per month. 
 
In Table 7, we present the results from the Ang and Zhang (2004) preferred Fama-
French WLS regressions.  These produce similar, but somewhat stronger, results than 
those from Table 6.  Again, debt issuers are the worst performing sub-group with a 
negative return of -0.28% per month, although the significance level is only 15.2%.  
The high FCF group exhibit a performance that is very close to zero.  By contrast, the 
low FCF group have significant returns of -0.37% per month.  In addition, we see that 
the low FCF group carry higher risk factor loadings on each of the three Fama-French 
factors than the high FCF group.  This is consistent with low FCF acquirers having a 
greater degree of distress risk.  Once again, the high FCF, low q group have 
insignificant positive returns but the remainder (non High FCF, low q firms) have 
returns that are a highly significant -0.36% per month.  This group also carries the 
highest exposure to market risk and the HML factor.  Finally, the results for the 
institutional ownership partition confirm those in Table 6.  It is the low ownership 
sub-group that have the worst (and significant) negative performance, and they also 
have a higher exposure to market and HML risk (though a lower small company risk). 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have argued that a clean test of the FCF hypothesis can be conducted 
by focussing on pure cash takeovers.  Indeed, Jensen himself sets up the motivation 
for this study when (1988, p. 34) he makes a the following claim: „free cash flow 
theory implies that managers of firms with unused borrowing power and large free 
cash flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or even value destroying 
mergers‟. We argue that looking at pure cash takeovers goes to the heart of this claim.  
Following Gompers et al (2003), and Cremers and Nair (2005), we hypothesised that 
the combination of strong shareholder rights and significant monitoring from 
institutional shareholders may significantly reduce any agency problems caused by 
high FCF. As the UK is characterised by an environment that has low protection 
against takeovers, and high levels of institutional shareholding, it offers an excellent 
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testing ground for this hypothesis.  When we test the FCF hypothesis in the UK 
environment, our results provide no evidence to support the FCF hypothesis.  Both 
announcement period and long terms returns show that acquirers with low free cash 
flow, not high free cash flow, are associated with acquisitions that damage 
shareholder wealth.  Indeed, the sub-grouping of firms with high FCF and low q ratios 
is the only grouping to exhibit positive (although not significant) long-run returns.  
Analysis of announcement period returns further suggest that high levels of pre-bid 
leverage may also have a negative impact on shareholder wealth.  In addition, we 
provide evidence from announcement period returns that relying on internal finance to 
finance cash acquisitions may be beneficial, whilst a reliance on debt financing may 
be detrimental.   However, whilst these effects carry through to the longer term, they 
are not statistically significant at long horizons.  Finally, we show that the benefits of 
having a high FCF seem to be greatest in firms financing acquisitions from internal 
finance. 
 
A question that we explore is why the UK evidence is so different from that of the 
US.  Of course, using the standard La Porta et al (1998) scoring of governance, the 
US and the UK do not look that different.  However, consistent with Cremers and 
Nair (2005), we argue that it is the stronger position of shareholders relative to firm 
managers that is important in the UK (Bush, 2005; Sudarsanam, 2000), and that 
furthermore the high level of institutional ownership coupled with a high 
concentration of fund managers (Stapledon and Bates, 2002) plays an important role 
in monitoring.  Consistent with that, we show that the positive effects of high FCF 
and the negative effects of high leverage are concentrated in high institutional 
ownership firms, although the former effect is not observed when we run our 
regressions using a cash holding, rather than a cash flow, proxy for FCF.  One 
explanation is that strong shareholder rights and good monitoring are capable of 
overcoming any inherent agency problems associated with high levels of FCF.  
However, we acknowledge that an alternative explanation is simply that the more 
liberal market for takeovers in the UK serves to discipline managers, an effect that 
would be predicted by the FCF hypothesis.   
 
In addition, our findings may be viewed as providing some support for the Myers and 
Majluf (1984) pecking-order theory.  Our results also provide support for a theory 
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where low FCF and high leverage predict financial distress.  Our regression tests 
show that this result is not simply an artefact of firm profitability, in that high FCF is 
positively associated with bidder returns even after ROCE is controlled for.  
Unfashionable as it may have been (at least until recently), we show that far from 
being undesirable, having higher levels of free cash flow and lower levels of debt can 
be associated with the superior performance of cash acquirers, provided strong 
shareholder rights and institutional shareholder monitoring is present.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
CAR5 152 -0.00205 0.050392 
CAR11 152 -0.00362 0.065058 
MBV 152 1.641652 2.433907 
HOSTILE 152 0.131579 0.33915 
OFFDIR5 152 0.655526 2.615442 
OFFDIR25 152 0.831974 4.934256 
INSTH 152 18.42863 24.22669 
NONINSTH 152 1.768355 8.041062 
RELSIZE 152 0.537103 1.070665 
PREMIUM 152 0.380404 0.310038 
IF 152 0.282895 0.451895 
IFS 152 0.243421 0.430566 
IEC 152 0.059211 0.236799 
ID 152 0.375 0.485723 
IECTV 152 0.222127 0.814503 
IDTV 152 1.940097 8.353692 
LEV 152 0.23398 0.228231 
ROCE 152 0.185049 0.182254 
AHQ 152 0.355263 0.480175 
CFCE 152 0.0885 0.139193 
HIGHFCFHQ 152 0.210526 0.40903 
HIGHFCFLQ 152 0.289474 0.455017 
LOWFCFHQ 152 0.144737 0.352998 
LOWFCFLQ 152 0.355263 0.480175 
CFCELQ 152 0.050374 0.108158 
The variables are defined as follows: CAR5, 11 = Cumulative abnormal returns for 
the 5 day interval t-2 to t+2, and the 11 day interval t-5 to t+5 respectively; MBV = 
Market value at the beginning of bid month / Book value at financial year end (FYE) 
prior to the bid year; HOSTILE = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is defined 
as a hostile bidder in the SDC platinum dataset; OFFDIR5 = 0 if directors‟ holdings 
(in %) are less than 5%, equal to Directors‟ holdings (in %) minus 5, if 5% < 
directors‟ holdings < 25%; OFFDIR25 = 0 if Directors‟ holdings (in %) < 25%, equal 
to Directors‟ holdings (in %) minus 25 if directors‟ holdings >=25%; INSTH = 
Amount of institutional shareholding in excess of 5%; NONINSTH = Amount of non-
institutional shareholdings in excess of 5%; RELSIZE = Market capitalisation of the 
target firm divided by market capitalisation of the acquirer; PREMIUM = bid 
premium paid for the target, measured as the bid price minus the price one month pre-
bid; IF = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is internal; 
IFS = Dummy variable equal to one if the source of bid financing is primarily internal 
but with a significant secondary issue of either debt or equity; IEC = Dummy variable 
equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is an equity issue; ID = Dummy 
variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is a debt issue; IECTV =  
Issued equity for cash used in the bid divided by transaction value; IDTV =    Issued 
debt used for the bid divided by transaction value; LEV =Acquirer‟s long-term debt 
divided by capital employed at FYE prior to the bid year; ROCE = Acquirer‟s pre-tax 
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profit before the bid divided by capital employed; AHQ = Dummy variable equal to 
one if the firm has low BMV (high q ratio) relative to its industry BMV; CFCE = FCF 
one year prior to the bid year divided by capital employed; HighFCHQ = Dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm has high CFCE and AHQ equal to one; HighFCLQ 
=Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has high CFCE and AHQ equal to zero; 
LowFCHQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low CFCE and AHQ equal 
to one; LowFCLQ = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low CFCE and 
AHQ equal to zero; CFCELQ = CFCE if the firm‟s AHQ equal to zero, zero 
otherwise 
 
 
 38 
 
Table 2: Significance tests of 5-day (t-2 to t+2) and 11-day (t-5 to t+5) CARs. 
 Full IF IFS ID High 
FCF 
Low 
FCF 
highFCFHQ highFCFLQ lowFCFHQ lowFCFLQ 
CAR 5 
Mean 
-0.00205 0.00773 -0.0001 -0.00344 0.00223 -0.00632 -0.00001 0.00385 -0.02290 0.00043 
Significance         *  
Median -0.00533 -0.00486 -0.01075 -0.00529 -0.00525 -0.00657 -0.00526 -0.00507 -.019276 -0.00323 
Significance         **  
CAR 11 
Mean 
-0.00362 0.01146 0.00518 -0.01780 0.00832 -0.01556 0.00703 0.00927 -0.04225 -0.00469 
Significance    **,++     **,+  
Median -0.00222 0.01582 0.00571 -0.01684 0.00841 -0.01321 0.01637 0.00694 -0.02582 -0.00765 
Significance    **  **   **  
Number of 
observations 
152 43 37 57 76 76 32 44 22 54 
Definitions are: IF = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is internal; IFS = Dummy variable equal to one if the 
source of bid financing is primarily internal but with a significant secondary issue of either debt or equity; ID = Dummy variable equal to one if 
the primary source of bid finance is a debt issue; CFCE = FCF one year prior to the bid year divided by capital employed; High FCF=dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm is above the median FCF; Low FCF=dummy variable equal to one if a firm is below the median FCF; HighFCHQ 
= Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has high CFCE and AHQ equal to one; HighFCLQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has 
high CFCE and AHQ equal to zero; LowFCHQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low CFCE and AHQ equal to one; LowFCLQ = 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low CFCE and AHQ equal to zero.  Significance levels are shown at 5% (**, ++) and 10% (*, +) 
levels from BW t-tests and boostrapped skewness-adjusted t-tests respectively, and for the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test in the case of medians. 
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Table 3: Difference Tests on CARS, t-5 to t+5 
Panel A FCF differences by category 
CAR 11 Full IF IFS ID 
High FCF-
LowFCF 
0.023889 0.045044 0.0141 0.013072 
 T-test for 
differences 
** **     
Wilcoxon / Mann-
Whitney test 
** **   
The table shows the CARs by category of financing, where IF = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is internal; 
IFS = Dummy variable equal to one if the source of bid financing is primarily internal but with a significant secondary issue of either debt or 
equity; IEC = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is an equity issue; ID = Dummy variable equal to one if the 
primary source of bid finance is a debt issue.  Significance levels are shown at 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels from two-tailed t-tests assuming 
unequal variances, and from a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
 
Panel B FCF differences partitioned on Q 
Group High FCF Low FCF Diff, HFCF-LowFCF  T-test for differences  Wilcoxon / Mann-
Whitney test 
High Q 0.007031 -0.04225 0.049281 ** *** 
Low Q 0.009265 -0.00469 -0.01396    
Diff, HQ=LQ 0.002234 0.03756      
 T-test for differences   *      
Wilcoxon / Mann-Whitney test  **    
Significance levels are shown at 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels from two-tailed t-tests assuming unequal variances. 
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Table 4 Regression tests with 11-day (t-5 to t+5) CARs as the dependent variable 
 
Independent Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
cfce 0.092 0.011 0.097 0.004                 
  (0.036)   (0.034)                   
ahq -0.017 0.109 -0.017 0.106                 
  (0.010)   (0.010)                   
cfcelq         0.075 0.106 0.085 0.056         
          (0.046)   (0.044)           
highfcfhq                 0.007 0.592 0.007 0.604 
                  (0.013)   (0.013)   
highfcflq                 0.011 0.438 0.013 0.353 
                  (0.014)   (0.013)   
lowfcfhq                 -0.035 0.046 -0.034 0.062 
                  (0.018)   (0.018)   
iectv     -0.008 0.229     -0.007 0.297     -0.008 0.242 
      (0.006)       (0.007)       (0.006)   
idtv     -0.001 0.006     -0.001 0.001     -0.001 0.075 
      (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)   
hostile 0.000 0.981 -0.002 0.899 0.000 0.980 -0.001 0.933 0.001 0.936 0.000 0.997 
  (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
offdir5 0.001 0.199 0.002 0.163 0.001 0.213 0.002 0.176 0.002 0.196 0.002 0.169 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
offdir25 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.878 0.000 0.653 0.000 0.635 0.000 0.484 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
insth 0.000 0.557 0.000 0.547 0.000 0.385 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.459 0.000 0.464 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
noninsth -0.001 0.123 -0.001 0.104 -0.001 0.093 -0.001 0.072 -0.001 0.151 -0.001 0.130 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
relsize -0.003 0.547 -0.003 0.550 -0.004 0.522 -0.004 0.522 -0.003 0.550 -0.003 0.563 
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  (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   
premium -0.017 0.350 -0.021 0.225 -0.016 0.374 -0.021 0.247 -0.018 0.295 -0.023 0.200 
  (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.017)   (0.018)   
roce 0.018 0.530 0.022 0.445 0.021 0.428 0.026 0.349 0.031 0.296 0.036 0.238 
  (0.029)   (0.029)   (0.027)   (0.028)   (0.029)   (0.030)   
lev -0.037 0.077 -0.036 0.089 -0.045 0.037 -0.044 0.042 -0.034 0.117 -0.032 0.134 
  (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   
_cons 0.007 0.572 0.011 0.379 0.005 0.645 0.009 0.441 0.006 0.665 0.009 0.540 
  (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.014)   (0.014)   
R-squared 0.123   0.143   0.093   0.113   0.127   0.142   
F-test probability 0.011   0.001   0.062   0.009   0.013   0.003   
Number of observations 152  152  152  152  152  152  
Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.  Variables are: CFCE = FCF one year prior to the bid year divided by capital 
employed; AHQ = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low BMV (high q ratio) relative to its industry BMV; High FCF=dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm is above the median FCF; Low FCF=dummy variable equal to one if a firm is below the median FCF; HighFCHQ 
= Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has high CFCE and AHQ equal to one; HighFCLQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has 
high CFCE and AHQ equal to zero; LowFCHQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low CFCE and AHQ equal to one; LowFCLQ = 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has low CFCE and AHQ equal to zero; CFCELQ = CFCE if the firm‟s AHQ equal to zero, zero 
otherwise; MBV = Market value at the beginning of bid month / Book value at financial year end (FYE) prior to the bid year; HOSTILE = 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is defined as a hostile bidder in the SDC platinum dataset; OFFDIR5 = 0 if directors‟ holdings (in %) 
are less than 5%, equal to Directors‟ holdings (in %) minus 5, if 5% < directors‟ holdings < 25%; OFFDIR25 = 0 if Directors‟ holdings (in %) < 
25%, equal to Directors‟ holdings (in %) minus 25 if directors‟ holdings >=25%; INSTH = Amount of institutional shareholding in excess of 
5%; NONINSTH = Amount of non-institutional shareholdings in excess of 5%; RELSIZE = Market capitalisation of the target firm divided by 
market capitalisation of the acquirer; PREMIUM = bid premium paid for the target, measured as the bid price minus the price one month pre-
bid; IECTV =  Issued equity for cash used in the bid divided by transaction value; IDTV =    Issued debt used for the bid divided by transaction 
value; LEV =Acquirer‟s long-term debt divided by capital employed at FYE prior to the bid year; ROCE = Acquirer‟s pre-tax profit before the 
bid divided by capital employed. 
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Table 5 Regression Tests with 11-day (t-5 to t+5) CARs as the dependent 
variable for sample split between high and low institutional ownership 
Inst. 
Ownership 
High, >=25% 
  
High, >=10% 
  
Low, <25% 
  
Low, <10% 
  
Independent 
Variables 
Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
cfcelq 0.128 0.031 0.109 0.064 0.105 0.204 0.054 0.563 
  (0.057)    (0.057)    (0.082)    (0.094)    
iectv 0.022 0.030 0.015 0.018 -0.011 0.206 -0.017 0.031 
  (0.010)    (0.006)    (0.009)    (0.008)    
idtv -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.000 0.555 0.003 0.381 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.003)    
hostile 0.000 0.995 0.002 0.942 -0.004 0.871 0.001 0.968 
  (0.025)    (0.023)    (0.026)    (0.029)    
offdir5 0.004 0.029 0.003 0.045 0.001 0.552 -0.001 0.767 
  (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.002)    
offdir25 0.001 0.779 0.001 0.769 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.457 
  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
insth 0.001 0.025 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.881 0.001 0.778 
  (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.002)    
noninsth 0.000 0.621 0.000 0.801 -0.001 0.339 -0.001 0.104 
  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
relsize 0.000 0.989 0.000 0.986 -0.011 0.217 -0.012 0.103 
  (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.009)    (0.007)    
premium 0.002 0.953 -0.024 0.458 -0.030 0.182 -0.027 0.248 
  (0.028)    (0.032)    (0.022)    (0.024)    
roce -0.020 0.661 0.011 0.779 0.043 0.354 0.036 0.486 
  (0.044)    (0.039)    (0.046)    (0.052)    
lev -0.081 0.230 -0.057 0.035 -0.026 0.263 0.002 0.963 
  (0.066)    (0.027)    (0.024)    (0.043)    
_cons -0.061 0.118 -0.011 0.707 0.012 0.512 0.007 0.742 
  (0.038)    (0.028)    (0.017)    (0.021)    
R-squared 0.319    0.196    0.138    0.201    
F-test 
probability 
0.004    0.001    0.003    0.000    
Number of 
observations 
46   70   106   82   
 
Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.  Variables are: 
CFCELQ = CFCE if the firm‟s AHQ equal to zero, zero otherwise; MBV = Market 
value at the beginning of bid month / Book value at financial year end (FYE) prior to 
the bid year; HOSTILE = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is defined as a 
hostile bidder in the SDC platinum dataset; OFFDIR5 = 0 if directors‟ holdings (in %) 
are less than 5%, equal to Directors‟ holdings (in %) minus 5, if 5% < directors‟ 
holdings < 25%; OFFDIR25 = 0 if Directors‟ holdings (in %) < 25%, equal to 
Directors‟ holdings (in %) minus 25 if directors‟ holdings >=25%; INSTH = Amount 
of institutional shareholding in excess of 5%; NONINSTH = Amount of non-
institutional shareholdings in excess of 5%; RELSIZE = Market capitalisation of the 
target firm divided by market capitalisation of the acquirer; PREMIUM = bid 
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premium paid for the target, measured as the bid price minus the price one month pre-
bid; IECTV =  Issued equity for cash used in the bid divided by transaction value; 
IDTV =    Issued debt used for the bid divided by transaction value; LEV =Acquirer‟s 
long-term debt divided by capital employed at FYE prior to the bid year; ROCE = 
Acquirer‟s pre-tax profit before the bid divided by capital employed.
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Table 6: GLS regressions of 60-month Calendar Time Returns on Size-matched Benchmark Returns 
 
 Full IF IFS ID High FCF Low FCF HFCFLQ Non-
HFCFLQ 
High Inst. 
Ownership 
Low Inst. 
Ownership 
N 279 265 265 279 266 279 263 279 276 265 
Alpha -0.002 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0013 -0.0031* 0.0011 -0.0032** 0.0024 -0.0036* 
P-value from t-test 0.177 0.55 0.769 0.181 0.473 0.096 0.666 0.041 0.284 0.069 
Beta 1.0967*** 0.9955*** 1.0126*** 1.1136*** 1.0704*** 1.1166*** 1.0573*** 1.1044*** .9989*** 1.0721*** 
P-value from t-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-square 0.8226 0.6006 0.5647 0.7407 0.72 0.7607 0.6015 0.8268 0.6269 0.7117 
 
The table shows the results of the results of regressing CT portfolio returns on their size-adjusted benchmarks by category of financing, using the 
procedure detailed in the text, where IF = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is internal; IFS = Dummy variable 
equal to one if the source of bid financing is primarily internal but with a significant secondary issue of either debt or equity; IEC = Dummy 
variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is an equity issue; ID = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid 
finance is a debt issue;  High FCF=dummy variable equal to one if a firm is above the median FCF; Low FCF=dummy variable equal to one if a 
firm is below the median FCF; HighFCLQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has high CFCE and AHQ equal to zero; High Inst. 
Ownership refers to that sub-group of firms which has institutional ownership greater than or equal to 25%, with Low Inst. Ownership being the 
sub-group that does not satisfy this criterion. Significance levels are shown at the 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 7: WLS regressions of 60-month Calendar Time Returns  
 
The regression is described in the text and is: 
 
tttftmtftt HMLhSMBsRRbaRR   ..,  
 
 Full IF IFS ID High FCF Low FCF HFCFLQ Non-
HFCFLQ 
High Inst. 
Ownership 
Low Inst. 
Ownership 
N 279 265 265 279 266 279 263 279 276 265 
Intercept -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0028 -0.0002 -0.0037** 0.0024 -0.0036*** 0.0021 -0.0037*** 
P-value from t-test 0.121 0.524 0.708 0.152 0.922 0.028 0.278 0.005 0.131 0.007 
RM-RF 1.0524*** 0.9749*** 1.1080*** 1.0550*** 1.0284*** 1.0783*** 1.0232*** 1.0629*** 0.8965*** 1.1071*** 
P-value from t-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMB 0.6989*** 0.6283*** 0.6738*** 0.7376*** 0.6599*** 0.7449*** 0.7700*** 0.6722*** 0. 8225*** 0.6399*** 
P-value from t-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HML 0.2800*** 0.3272*** 0.1878** 0.2625*** 0.2145*** 0.3333*** 0.2431*** 0. 2953*** 0. 2553*** 0.2992*** 
P-value from t-test 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-square 0.8707 0.6587 0.7289 0.7668 0.798 0.8274 0.6306 0.8999 0.6813 0.8894 
 
The table shows the results of the results of a WLS regression of CT portfolio excess returns on the Fama-French factors by category of 
financing, where IF = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is internal; IFS = Dummy variable equal to one if the 
source of bid financing is primarily internal but with a significant secondary issue of either debt or equity; IEC = Dummy variable equal to one if 
the primary source of bid finance is an equity issue; ID = Dummy variable equal to one if the primary source of bid finance is a debt issue;  High 
FCF=dummy variable equal to one if a firm is above the median FCF; Low FCF=dummy variable equal to one if a firm is below the median 
FCF; HighFCLQ =Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has high CFCE and AHQ equal to zero; High Inst. Ownership refers to that sub-
group of firms which has institutional ownership greater than or equal to 25%, with Low Inst. Ownership being the sub-group that does not 
satisfy this criterion. Significance levels are shown at the 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
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Appendix: Shareholding patterns (in percent) in the UK and US 
UK DATA 
PENSION 
FUNDS 
INSURANCE 
COS 
UNIT 
TRUSTS 
IINVESTMENT 
TRUSTS & 
OTHER FIN. 
INST. 
BANK 
PERSONAL 
TRUSTS FOREIGN 
INDIVIDUALS & 
CHARITIES OTHER TOTAL 
DOMESTIC 
INSTITUTION-
AL TOTAL 
1990 31.7 20.4 6.1 2.3 N/A 11.8 22.2 5.5 100 60.5 
1994 27.8 21.9 6.8 3.3 N/A 16.3 21.6 2.4 100 59.8 
1999 19.6 21.6 2.7 7 N/A 29.3 16.6 3.3 100 50.9 
           
US DATA 
PENSION 
FUNDS 
INSURANCE 
COS 
Open 
Ended 
MUTUAL 
Closed Ended 
MUTUAL 
BANK PERS 
TRUSTS FOREIGN 
HOUESHOLD & 
NON-PROFIT OTHER  
DOMESTIC 
INSTITUTION-
AL TOTAL 
1990 24.4 4.6 6.6 0.5 5.4 6.9 51.0 0.7 100 36.0 
1995 23.2 5.3 12.1 0.5 2.7 6.2 49.1 1.0 100 41.1 
1999 17.9 6.0 17.4 0.2 1.7 7.9 47.7 1.3 100 41.4 
 
Sources: UK Data are from the Office Of National Statistics, Share Ownership Report as at 31
st
 December 2003. Available on line at 
www.statistics.gov.uk.  US data are derived from the NYSE Factbook On Line at www.nysedata.com/factbook/.  
 
 
